The Tren de Aragua, a name that translates to “Aragua Train,” has emerged as one of the most notorious criminal organizations in Latin America, with a growing presence that has sparked international concern. Born in the chaotic environment of a Venezuelan prison, the gang has evolved from a local syndicate to a transnational criminal enterprise, exploiting economic collapse, mass migration, and lax governance to expand its reach. This blog explores the history of Tren de Aragua, tracing its origins, growth, and impact across the Americas.
The story of Tren de Aragua begins in the early 2010s in Venezuela’s Tocorón prison, located in Aragua state, approximately 80 miles southwest of Caracas. 
The gang’s name likely derives from a failed railway project in the region, possibly tied to a workers’ union that turned to criminal activities like extortion after the project’s collapse. By 2014, under the leadership of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” Tren de Aragua had solidified its control over Tocorón, transforming the prison into a veritable fortress of criminal activity.
Tocorón was no ordinary prison. With the Venezuelan government adopting a hands-off approach—allowing crime bosses known as pranes to govern prisons—the facility became a hub of luxury and lawlessness. Tren de Aragua ran a zoo, nightclub, restaurant, and even a bank within the prison walls, with tunnels facilitating the movement of people and contraband. From this stronghold, the gang orchestrated a range of criminal enterprises, including extortion, kidnapping, and murder, both inside and outside the prison.
The mass exodus of over 7.7 million Venezuelans since 2014, one of the largest displacements in modern history, provided Tren de Aragua with a unique opportunity. The gang embedded itself within migrant flows, recruiting vulnerable individuals and establishing criminal cells in countries like Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. By 2018, Tren de Aragua had begun operations along the Venezuela-Colombia border, engaging in human trafficking, drug smuggling, and extortion.
In Chile, its branch known as “Pirates of Aragua” was linked to human trafficking and violent crimes, including the 2024 murder of Ronald Ojeda, a Venezuelan dissident. In Brazil, alliances with the powerful Primeiro Comando da Capital bolstered its operations. The gang’s criminal portfolio grew to include human smuggling, sex trafficking, contract killings, and retail drug trafficking, often involving a party drug called “tusi.”This transnational expansion was marked by extreme violence. In Colombia, authorities attributed at least 23 murders to the gang in 2022, with body parts found in bags. In Chile, authorities dismantled a local branch in 2022, arresting members with Interpol warrants for murders in Venezuela and Peru. Tren de Aragua’s ability to exploit migrant vulnerabilities and form alliances with local criminal groups made it a formidable regional player.
High-profile incidents, like a viral video from Aurora, Colorado, showing armed men entering an apartment complex, amplified fears of the gang’s influence.
However, experts argue that Tren de Aragua’s U.S. presence is less organized than portrayed, with many incidents involving individuals claiming affiliation for clout rather than coordinated gang activity. The Department of Homeland Security estimated in 2023 that fewer than 600 Venezuelan migrants had connections to the gang, a tiny fraction of the 700,000 Venezuelans in the U.S.
In September 2023, the Venezuelan government launched a massive raid on Tocorón prison, deploying 11,000 troops to retake control. The operation disrupted Tren de Aragua’s stronghold, but Niño Guerrero and other leaders escaped, reportedly tipped off in advance. Venezuelan authorities claimed the gang was dismantled, but its transnational networks continued to thrive.
In the U.S., the Biden administration designated Tren de Aragua a transnational criminal organization in July 2024, offering $12 million in rewards for its leaders’ capture. The Trump administration, starting in January 2025, escalated measures by labeling the gang a foreign terrorist organization and invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to deport alleged members, sparking legal challenges and accusations of targeting Venezuelan migrants broadly. Deportations, including to El Salvador’s notorious CECOT prison, raised concerns about due process, with some deportees claiming they were misidentified based on tattoos or hometowns.
While Tren de Aragua is undoubtedly a violent and disruptive force, its portrayal as a monolithic threat may be exaggerated. Experts note that the gang lacks the structure of larger syndicates like MS-13 and operates as a loose network. Its U.S. activities, though concerning, are less coordinated than claimed, and heavy-handed policies like mass deportations may inadvertently strengthen the gang by fostering networks in prisons, as seen with MS-13 in the 1990s.
The gang’s rise reflects deeper issues: Venezuela’s economic collapse, unchecked prison governance, and the vulnerabilities of migrant populations. For Venezuelan migrants, the focus on Tren de Aragua has fueled stigma, with many facing discrimination based on nationality alone. As governments across the Americas grapple with the gang’s spread, addressing root causes—poverty, migration pressures, and weak institutions—will be as crucial as law enforcement efforts.